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The borders of New Haven, Connecticut, like those of many other American cities, 
appear to be wildly irrational. Starting on the west side of New Haven harbor, the boundary 
follows the West River northward for slightly more than a mile, suddenly jogging west for two 
miles then continuing north and veering northeast. Before turning eastward, the line juts out to 
capture two oddly shaped protrusions in the northwest comer of the city. After traveling east for 
four miles the boundary banks 120° south to include a four mile-long, half-mile wide strip along 
the east side of the harbor. Somehow, New Haven has taken the shape of a pregnant kangaroo. 1 
One view of municipal boundaries is that they developed naturally, through the interplay 
of economic and physical forces. 2 Others see the manner in which municipalities have 
fragmented as a result of a properly-functioning democratic process.3 Still others consider 
municipal boundaries a fluke, nothing more than an historical accident. 4 An accurate history of 
border development can contribute to the ongoing debate over the propriety of metropolitan 
fragmentation, 5 by gauging the accuracy of these competing descriptions, and providing a 
template of past border change processes. 
This paper will examine the development of the borders of New Haven, Connecticut. 
Part One provides a brief summary of local boundary change law, its history, and the theoretical 
underpinnings of the scholarship dealing with the issue. Part Two presents an exhaustive 
account of the evolution of New Haven's borders. New Haven is an interesting case for study, 
1 See Appendix B, Map 3, infra. 
2 See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1843, 1858 (1994) (characterizing this view as "opaque" and criticizing its explanatory power). 
3 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 625 
(1997) ("The present state oflocal government, then, should come as no surprise. Its creation was not happenstance, 
but rather a deliberate attempt to empower the individual."). 
4 See WILLlAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 209 (2001) (describing and rejecting this viewpoint). 
Under this conception, present municipal borders are a form of path dependence: starting anew society 
could draw better borders, but we are constrained from doing so because of past, now irrelevant, events. See 
generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 107 HARV. L. REV. 641(1996) (discussing the 
role of path dependence in law). 
5 See infra Section LB. 
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